Litigation looms as crash scene photographs were reportedly disclosed against the wishes of Kobe Bryant's wife.

On the morning of January 26, 2020, a helicopter with nine people aboard, including Kobe Bryant and his daughter, crashed into the side of a mountain in Calabasas, California, killing them all. His wife, Vanessa Bryant, visited the responding substation for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office in-person to request the office to designate the area a no-fly zone in the immediate aftermath of the crash. 

Her reason was simple. She wanted to exclude photographers from the scene in order to “protect the dignity of all victims, and their families,” according to her lawyer’s statement on February 29, 2020. Apparently, there is an industry for the photographs of celebrities, and morbidly, their deaths. In response, the sheriff’s office assured her it would take all measures available to protect the privacy of the victims and their families.

However, Sports Illustrated published an article recapping a couple reports from the Los Angeles Times and TMZ explaining that a bartender overheard a patron boasting of pictures from the scene of the accident while showing them to other patrons at the bar. According to those reports, the person with the photographs was purportedly a trainee of the sheriff’s office. Sports Illustrated confirmed that the bartender filed an online report after he witnessed the patron’s actions; knowledge of this report prompted Mrs. Bryant and her counsel to demand an internal investigation behind the alleged disclosure. It also portends the potential for legal action, including claims for invasion of privacy and the negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Although North Carolina law does not apply, our state courts recognize both as causes of action to bring against those responsible for the apparent disclosure. By way of illustration, this blog article will look at those torts and apply the bartender’s reported contentions against the patron to test their viability if North Carolina law governed the case. 

Invasion of Privacy by Intrusion into Seclusion: An individual can establish a case grounded in this theory where (1) the defendant intruded upon the privacy of that person; (2) the defendant acted with intent; i.e., knowingly, or with purpose, or with reckless indifference to consequence of the intrusion; and (3) the intrusion would highly offend a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances. Keyzer v. Amerlink, Ltd., 173 N.C. App. 284, 618 S.E.2d 768 (2005), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 397, 627 S.E.2d 462 (2006) (reasoning the kinds of intrusions that have been recognized under this tort include physically invading a person’s home or other private place, eavesdropping by wiretapping or microphones, peering through windows, persistent telephoning, unauthorized prying into a bank account, and opening personal mail of another).

Interestingly, North Carolina courts confirmed in 2011 that the accessing, viewing, disclosing, or publishing of autopsy photographs cannot be an intrusion because autopsy photographs, by statute, are readily accessible by any person for inspection and examination. Tillet v. Onslow Mem. Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 538, 541 (2011). However, the reported allegations of this case differ from that one in critical regard. Crash scene photographs conducted pursuant to law enforcement investigations are not readily accessible to the general public, if at all. That would seemingly justify a reason for Mrs. Bryant to expect privacy compared to the legally required public nature of an autopsy report. With that distinction in mind, Mrs. Bryant could likely satisfy the other elements should the information be true. The defendant apparently acted with purpose in order to brag and boast to other patrons at the bar. The disclosure of the photographs would also highly offend a reasonable person standing in Mrs. Bryant’s shoes, in addition to the families of the other victims of the crash. So, it appears as though she could establish intrusion of privacy as a cause of action to bring against the disclosing individual if North Carolina law applied.

The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A plaintiff can make a case for negligent infliction of emotional distress where (1) the defendant was negligent; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) defendant’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer that severe emotional distress. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990). Here, reports suggest that the bar patron disclosed the crash scene photographs to other patrons to boast about his knowledge of the case; that negligently disregards the emotional wellbeing of Mrs. Bryant and the families of the victims of the crash. Presuming, for the sake of this analysis only, Mrs. Bryant could demonstrate she suffered severe emotional distress at the hands of that disclosure, then the negligent infliction of emotional distress could also be a viable option for relief if North Carolina law applied. 

The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Relatedly, a plaintiff can make a case for intentional infliction of emotional distress where (1) the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct --- the type that exceeds all bounds a decent society can tolerate; (2) that defendant’s conduct intended to cause, or was recklessly indifferent to the likelihood it would cause, plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress; and (3) defendant’s conduct in fact caused plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).

As mentioned in the previous section, this analysis presumes Mrs. Bryant suffered severe emotional distress due to the public disclosure of the photographs. The intentional element to this cause of action might be satisfied when there is actual knowledge of the potential for harm. That’s evident in this case. Mrs. Bryant visited the sheriff’s office in-person to request it to designate the area a no-fly zone to protect against the very harm the office was then allegedly responsible for causing when a trainee reportedly distributed pictures of the crash to patrons at a bar. If true, such a disclosure was recklessly indifferent to the likelihood it would impugn the dignity of Mrs. Bryant and the families of the victims. It’s possible, then, that Mrs. Bryant could establish intentional infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action, too, if North Carolina applied.

This is a pretend, surface-level analysis of how North Carolina law could provide Mrs. Bryant relief should the reports be true and if North Carolina law applied. It goes to show that the law can be a refuge for victims and their families when a person infringes on rights that are intangible and subject to elusive definitions, such as the right to privacy and the right to grieve the death of a loved one.